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Comment  Pervenche Berès
First of all, I would like to thank Cecchetti and Schoenholtz for their in- 
depth chapter, taking into account that among seventeen interviews, sixteen 
were conducted with central bankers. Before anything else, let me tell you 
that I share their general positive appraisal of the ﬁ  rst decade of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), and maybe especially of the last year. I welcome 
the fact that the euro has brought stability and fostered economic integration 
in the euro area, even if internal economic divergences have not diminished 
enough and productivity has not developed satisfactorily.
Reacting on their chapter, I suggest coming back on key issues to be fur-
ther explored for the discussion, especially concerning the main challenges 
ahead.
First, I would like to come back to the ECB’s operational framework. 
Together with Werner Langen, from the Economic and Monetary Commit-
tee of the European Parliament, I have drafted a report, EMU@10: The First 
Ten Years of Economic and Monetary Union and Future Challenges (Berès 
and Langen 2008), following the communication of the Commission last 
spring. The report addresses many elements of this debate; it was voted in 
ECON and November 2008 in plenary session. I will now discuss the chapter 
with elements on monetary policy that are developed in our report.
As regards the deﬁ  nition of price stability, the ECB aims at inﬂ  ation rates 
of below, but close to, 2 percent over the medium term. We consider that 
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this deﬁ  nition should be examined in the context of increased heterogeneity 
of the euro area and the need to ensure ﬁ  nancial stability. The presentation 
points out that this would be a good monetary policy, I would, however, 
specify add in good times, where all central bankers could follow a line of 
price stability that was eased by the prevailing condition of globalization, 
with a strong pressure on consumer good prices that was based on outsourc-
ing. Let us not forget that the objective of price stability can be achieved 
eﬀectively only if the root causes of inﬂ  ation are properly addressed. And 
let us keep in mind that article 105 of the EC Treaty also assigned to the 
ECB the task of supporting the general economic policies of the Commu-
nity, even though I believe it will become more diﬃcult now for the ECB to 
argue that the best way to achieve this broader task is price stability. Here 
and there, the issue of who should set the deﬁ  nition of price stability or the 
inﬂ  ation target is also discussed. The question is whether the Council and the 
European Parliament could or should be involved in such a discussion.
We are also of the opinion that the ECB should move toward a direct 
inﬂ  ation targeting regime where a point inﬂ  ation target is supplemented by 
a range of permitted ﬂ  uctuations around the target rate, and should make 
public its inﬂ  ation forecasts. This should not preclude paying attention to 
the dynamics of monetary aggregates in order to avoid new asset bubbles, 
even if asset bubbles can be better addressed by proper regulation than by 
monetary policy.
We also stress the necessity of exploring possible improvements in the 
procedure for appointing the members of the ECB’s executive board before 
2010. We agree with Cecchetti’s and Schoenholtz’s view that it is important 
that a variety of backgrounds be represented among executive board mem-
bers: I would mention academic or professional experience, and background 
in the economic, monetary, and ﬁ  nancial sector. But let me admit that 
as regards this nomination procedure and its practice, I have two strong re-
grets. One is that the Council merely rubberstamps the proposals made by 
the Member States when they come from a big country and by doing so, 
does not exert one of its important decision powers related to the shaping of 
monetary policy. The second one is that the EP is only consulted, contrary 
to the power it has regarding the appointment of Commissioners and the 
U.S. Congress has vis-  à-  vis the Fed.
On transparency and accountability, I regret that your chapter does not 
make mention—at least once—of the European Parliament, and surpris-
ingly enough, you do not discuss “accountability,” but rather “communica-
tion” issues. The regular reports of the ECB to Parliament, in particular to 
its Committee on Economic and Monetary Aﬀairs, as well as the regular 
ex-change of views with the Pr President of the ECB constitute a monetary 
dialogue and contribute to the transparency of monetary policy. It improves 
the accountability of the ECB vis- à- vis the citizens of the Union. I am more-
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and currency policies in the euro area as part of the convergence process. 
The truth is that the shaping of the ECB’s accountability is an original 
one, since there is no euro zone country or constituency. Because of this, 
it could not be shaped on the basis of the previous German model, where 
the Bundesbank was accountable to the country and its citizens. It does not 
completely follow the U.S. model either, where the Fed is closely accountable 
to the Congress (that has nomination powers and can change the statute of 
the Fed).
A second issue to be further explored is the question of enlargement. I 
regard an enduring and successful expansion of the euro area as a major 
challenge for the coming years, whereby both institutional standards for the 
ECB and the decision- making process of the ECB have to be adapted to this 
change. Moreover, the rotation model has to take into account the economic 
weight of the individual member States.
In this context, I draw attention to our calls for an ECB executive board 
of nine members, thus replacing the system existing now and avoiding the 
even more complex solution decided upon for the future, with the enlarge-
ment of the euro area. This has been the EP’s position for years, since the 
ECB has imposed to the Council its ideas about the future rotation system.
Just a word on the conditions of enlargement: if equal treatment of the 
Member States in the euro area and Member States wishing to join must be 
ensured, long-  term stability of the euro area must be regarded as an aim of 
common interest. Enlargement and stability must go hand in hand.
On communication, a topic that is stressed several times in your chapter, 
I indeed share the view that communication is of utmost importance to 
prepare the introduction of the euro in the Member States planning to join 
the euro area; I would add that communication on the enlargement of the 
euro area is also important for all Member States in the euro area. But if you 
realize that the ECB celebrated the tenth anniversary of the euro on the 1st 
of January 2009 and that the citizens were celebrating the ﬁ  fth anniversary 
of coins and notes on the 1st of January 2007, you can measure the gap in 
terms of communication.
The major issue is the challenge of ﬁ  nancial stability, as stated by Cec-
chetti and Schoenhotz. The papers seem to open space for a certain confu-
sion between the need for EU regulation and supervision. In reality, the 
single EU regulator already exists; what is lacking in this ﬁ  eld is a coherent 
implementation of the regulation and an EU supervision.
I believe that the EU urgently needs to enhance its supervision structure, 
taking into account the speciﬁ  c role of the ECB. The European Parliament 
has been extremely active on this issue. An initiative report from the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Committee with recommendations to the Commission 
on Lamfalussy follow-  up and the future structure of supervision has just 
been voted in plenary session last month.
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ket transparency, eﬀective competition rules, and appropriate regulation 
is necessary in the medium term, in order to improve crisis management 
and cooperation between the European System of Central Banks, super-
visory authorities, governments, and market participants. An integrated, 
comprehensive (covering all ﬁ  nancial sectors), consistent, and coherent 
supervisory framework starting with a balanced approach in regulating the 
cross- border spread of ﬁ  nancial risk on the basis of harmonized legislation 
would decrease compliance costs in the case of multijurisdiction activities. 
In recent diﬀerent reports, the Parliament calls on the Commission to put 
forward proposals for revising the existing supervisory architecture along 
those principles. If we want to have a two-  step approach, what is needed 
is to start with an upgrade of the three level-  three committees and then to 
move toward a European system of national supervisors along the lines of 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). In any solution, the role of 
the ECB will need to be increased and deﬁ  ned so as to ensure and deﬁ  ne a 
good articulation between a macro and a micro prudential approach.
Finally, let me brieﬂ  y refer to topics that we cannot develop here, because 
time is limited, but that are worth mentioning. Of course, as Cecchetti and 
Schoenholtz have mentioned, many disappointments of the ﬁ  rst decade 
come from “outside the ECB.” I can only echo this point. But we need to 
recall that they are not the only ones responsible for this situation. We have 
already mentioned the lack of initiative or involvement when it comes to 
nominations to the board or to supervision issues. But it could also be said 
regarding the way the Council up to now has used its powers regarding 
exchange rates or the power to speak at the Council of governors meeting, 
where the absence of the Council results in Jean-  Claude Trichet being the 
only one to speak on wages but also on the level of public spending. I agree 
that future challenges concern not only the ECB, but structural and ﬁ  scal 
reform, as well as economic governance.
In particular, I am convinced that the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
policy agenda for the next decade will be marked by the challenges pre-
sented by the recent ﬁ  nancial market turmoil and its implications for the 
real economy. I note in this context that Member States within the euro 
area are better equipped to face major shocks than in the past thanks to the 
common monetary policy and reforms carried out in recent years. However, 
in the interest to largely combat economic slowdown and high inﬂ  ation, I 
would suggest:
￿   A coordinated response at the EU level, based on common understand-
ing of the problems and common follow-  up measures while accepting 
some national speciﬁ  cities.
￿   Ambitious and adjusted National Reform Programmes and their 
  committed implementation, including strong dialogues with social 
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￿    Fully and timely implementation of the Financial Services roadmap, 
including follow-  up actions and increased eﬀectiveness of supervision 
to the ongoing ﬁ  nancial turmoil.
￿    Completing the tools used for designing monetary policy by the thor-
ough analysis of factors that inﬂ  uence the stability and functioning of 
the ﬁ  nancial system.
￿   A proactive European reaction within international fora, notably at the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the increase of common political decision-  making pro-
cesses.
￿    Organizing the European voice within the G8 and reﬂ  ecting on its role 
as a more eﬃcient worldwide economic decision-  making body while 
adjusting it to the consequences of globalization and more dominant 
worldwide acting ﬁ  nancial markets.
In conclusion, I would like to underline that more needs to be done to 
reap the full beneﬁ  ts of EMU and to strengthen citizens’ understanding and 
commitment to the ECB and the single currency.
I recall that during the ﬁ  rst decade of EMU, Parliament has done a huge 
amount of work to ensure more transparency and democratic accountability 
of the ECB. In the background of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the European Par-
liament is currently playing an active role, on legislative or nonlegislative 
ﬁ  les, to help build adequate answers to the challenges that face the ECB, in 
particular in the area of ﬁ  nancial stability.
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